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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5442
Although Kenya’s financial system is by far the largest 
and most developed in East Africa and its stability 
has improved significantly over the past years, many 
challenges remain. This paper assesses the stability, 
efficiency, and outreach of Kenya’s banking system, 
using aggregate, bank-level, and survey data. Banks’ 
asset quality and liquidity positions have improved, 
making the system more resistant to shocks, and interest 
rate spreads have declined, in part due to reduction in 
the overhead costs of foreign banks. Outreach remains 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of a 
larger effort in the department to study the efficiency and outreach of African financial sectors. Policy Research Working 
Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at rcull@worldbank.org. 
limited, but has improved in recent years, driven by 
mobile payments services in the domestic remittance 
market. Fostering a level regulatory playing field for all 
deposit-taking institutions is a key remaining challenge. 
Specifically, an effective but not overly burdensome 
framework for regulation and supervision of microfinance 
institutions and cooperatives is a priority. Maintaining 
an openness to new, and non-bank, providers of financial 
services, which has enabled the success of mobile 
payments, could also further outreach. 
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1.  Introduction 
The current crisis has put the financial sector again at the center of policy makers’ attention 
across the developed and developing world. While in recent years, the financial sector debate 
across the African continent has been dominated by policies to increase access to financial 
services, minimizing the impact of the crisis currently tops the agenda.  Financial systems across 
Africa have seen a deepening and broadening over the past years, partly benefiting from the 
Great Moderation and global liquidity glut, but also from improvements in macroeconomic 
policies and progress in institutional reforms (Beck, Fuchs and Uy, 2009).   This paper discusses 
the recent development of the financial sector in the major East African economy of Kenya, in 
the context of recent reforms.  
By African standards and in comparison with other East African economies, Kenya’s 
banking sector has for many years been credited for its size and diversification. Private credit to 
GDP – a standard indicator of financial development, was 23.7% in 2008, compared to a median 
of 12.3% for Sub-Saharan Africa (Table 1). While this number is not higher than it was in 2005, 
the quality of lending has significantly improved, as can be seen in the increasing ratio of loans 
net of provision relative to GDP (Table 2).
2  Unlike most other countries in the region, Kenya 
has a variety of financial institutions and markets – banks, insurance companies, stock and bond 
markets - that provide an array of financial products.  Notwithstanding this relative advantage, 
Kenya’s financial system has failed to provide adequate access to banking services to the bulk of 
the population. While the larger proportion of savings comes from small depositors, lending is 
skewed in favor of large private and public enterprises in urban areas. Financial services are 
expensive, as evidenced by high interest rate spreads (see Figure 1 below) and account fees.
3  
                                                            
2 The figure for Sub-Saharan Africa is taken from Allen, Carletti, Cull, Qian, and Senbet (2009). 
3 We note, however, that Kenya’s net interest margins are on par with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (Table 1). 
While there are some countries in Latin America that have higher interest margins and spreads than Kenya, a recent 
comparison shows that Kenya ranked 8
th of 37 countries in interest spreads in 2008 and 12
th of 66 countries in net 
interest margins from 2001-2009. Also, Uganda’s spreads and margins, which are higher than those in Kenya rank 
in the top five on both dimensions. In all, the evidence points to Kenya’s margins and spreads as being relatively 
high. See Jorgensen et al. (2010) for the international comparisons of interest spreads and net interest margins.     3 
 
Table 1.  Kenya’s Financial System in Regional Comparison 
  Private Credit to GDP  Liquid Liabilities to GDP  Net interest margin 
Kenya 23.7%  36.0%  6.6% 
Tanzania 12.3%  26.3%  6.6% 
Uganda 7.2%  20.7%  11.7% 
Sub-Saharan Africa (median)  12.3%  23.0%  6.6% 
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009) 
Kenya’s sector faced major crises in the 1980s and 1990s, due to under-capitalization, high 
levels of non-performing loans and weaknesses in corporate governance. NBFIs were most 
affected, but the number of failing commercial banks increased as well in the 1990s. The crisis 
culminated in 1992, when - according to Honohan and Laeven (2005) - Kenya suffered formally 
a systemic banking crisis. 
Table 2. Growth and Structure of the Banking Sector, 2000 to 2007 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
          
Private  Credit/GDP  25.6% 24.1% 23.5% 23.1% 23.2% 23.8% 24.3% 22.4% 
Loans (Net of Provisions)/GDP  20.9%  20.2%  20.9%  20.5%  22.8%  23.5%  23.6%  24.8% 
Real  GDP  Growth  0.5% 4.5% 0.5% 2.9% 5.1% 5.7% 6.1% 6.9% 
Share of Banking Sector Assets          
Foreign    44.3% 46.3% 48.3% 48.7% 45.3% 43.4% 43.8% 43.5% 
Private  Domestic  21.9% 22.7% 22.6% 24.1% 25.7% 28.7% 29.9% 31.0% 
Government    7.1% 7.1% 6.6% 6.0% 6.2% 5.6% 5.3% 4.8% 
           NBK  6.1%  5.9%  5.7%  5.2%  5.5%  5.2%  4.8%  4.4% 
Government-influenced  26.7% 23.9% 22.5% 21.2% 22.7% 22.2% 21.1% 20.7% 
           KCB  16.6%  15.0%  12.8% 11.7% 11.9% 11.8% 11.5% 11.9% 
           Cooperative  5.7%  5.2%  6.5%  6.5%  8.3%  8.2%  7.7%  6.9% 
          
Share of Total Loans (Net of 
Provisions) 
        
Foreign    39.9% 40.8% 41.9% 43.7% 42.5% 42.3% 41.0% 44.5% 
Private  Domestic  22.1% 22.0% 22.6% 24.4% 25.4% 28.8% 31.4% 31.5% 
Government    10.0% 9.8%  10.0% 9.7% 8.4% 7.7% 7.3% 2.0% 
           NBK  9.2%  8.9%  9.0%  8.7%  7.6%  7.3%  6.8%  1.6% 
Government-influenced  28.0% 27.4% 25.5% 22.3% 23.6% 21.3% 20.3% 22.0% 
           KCB  16.5%  15.8%  12.8% 10.7% 11.5%  9.9% 10.5% 11.5% 
           Cooperative  5.8%  6.3%  8.3%  7.7%  9.2%  8.7%  7.2%  7.7% 
Sources: For Private Credit/GDP, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009). For real GDP Growth and nominal 
GDP, World Development Indicators.  Data for all other calculations are from the Central Bank of Kenya. 
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In 2003, the Government of Kenya (GoK) published the Economic Recovery Strategy 
(ERS) paper on Wealth Creation and Employment that defined certain critical high-level 
objectives that underlied the reform efforts through 2007. In the ERS, the government 
acknowledged that the banking sector was experiencing difficulties that would undermine the 
achievement of the objectives set out in the ERS, including a  comparatively high ratio of non-
performing loans in some major banks, inadequate competition in the banking sector; persistence 
of wide interest rate spreads leading to a high cost of credit; insufficient quantities of credit (and 
poor quality credit assessments); absence of vibrant institutions for provision of long term 
finance; weak legal arrangements creating long delays in contract enforcement; and weak dispute 
resolution mechanisms. 
In recent years, Kenya has made substantial progress in improving the stability and 
efficiency of its banking system.  Upgrading of the supervisory framework was accompanied by 
write-off of non-performing loans and reductions in government’s role in the financial sector.  
Interest spreads, while still high, have come down recently, due to lower loan loss provisions and 
overhead costs, but also lower profit margins, suggesting a certain degree of competition. This 
was accompanied by a reduction in inflation and the fiscal deficit and stable exchange rates, 
which in turn facilitated not only a drop in interest rates, but also improvements in the 
government-managed and influenced government institutions. Kenya’s financial system, 
however, continues to face challenges. The banking system is still fragmented, with many small 
banks serving specific niches, but not contributing to competition in the sector.  The outreach of 
the financial system is still limited.  
In 2007, GOK published “Kenya’s Vision 2030” as a long term development plan for the 
country which puts provision of financial services at the centre of the planned economic growth 
trajectory through the year 2030. The main objectives that were articulated in Vision 2030 for the 
financial sector were to (i) improve stability, (ii) enhance efficiency in the delivery of credit and 
other financial services, and (iii) improve access to financial services and products for a much 
larger number of Kenyan households.  Delivery of these objectives requires implementation of 
policies that would contribute to stable macro and fiscal positions aimed at lower inflation and 
financial sector stability.  5 
 
The current global financial crisis has underlined the need for further and deeper reforms, 
while at the same time potentially undermining progress made so far.  The drastic reduction in 
international capital flows forces most countries in the region to rely more on domestic resources 
and increase domestic intermediation efficiency.  Beyond macroeconomic policies and 
institutional reforms, issues of market structure will become important in the coming years.  
Theory and international evidence are ambiguous on the relationship between bank concentration 
and stability. The experience in Nigeria is too fresh to draw inferences from, but has raised 
awareness of the issue across the region. As we will discuss below, there is no clear mapping 
from market structure to competition; attempts to consolidate the sector might increase efficiency 
and stability, with ambiguous implications for outreach, but the ultimate effect will depend on 
the future ownership structure of the Kenyan banking system and the underlying financial 
infrastructure, including the contractual framework and possible credit registry.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses Kenya’s 
financial safety net, including recent changes in the regulatory framework and the deposit 
insurance scheme. Section 3 addresses the stability of banks, in the context of the current market 
structure.  Section 4 presents trends in interest rates spreads and its components over the past 
seven years.  Section 5 discusses the outreach of Kenya’s banking system, based on recent 
household surveys. Section 6 discusses the case for regulation-induced consolidation in the 
sector, based on the findings of the previous sections and international experience, and section 7 
concludes.  
2.  The Regulatory Framework for Banking in Kenya 
Given the critical role of banks for a modern market economy, the opacity of banks’ balance 
sheets, the dispersion of banks’ creditors – typically many small depositors – and the maturity 
transformation banks perform converting short-term deposits into medium- to long-term assets 
there are limitations to market discipline and additional sources of fragility, compared to non-
financial corporations. Banking has therefore historically been one of the most regulated sectors, 
with regulation ranging from licensing requirements to on-going supervision to a bank-specific 
failure regime and deposit insurance.  6 
 
In Kenya, the Central Bank (CBK) is responsible for regulation and supervision of banks. 
Over the past decades, there have been numerous revisions to the Banking Act, Central Bank of 
Kenya Act and prudential guidelines aimed at strengthening CBK’s supervisory role. The 
Banking Act has been reviewed over time to give more legal powers to the regulatory authority 
and to broaden the responsibilities and coverage of institutions. The first comprehensive review 
was made in 1985 following the rapid growth of NBFIs that was mainly attributed to weaknesses 
in the regulatory framework. In addition, there was a change in the licensing procedures for 
banks that introduced a clearer mandate for the Central Bank in the licensing process. 
In 1995, further amendments of the Banking Act were made aimed at further 
strengthening supervision of the banking industry. Prudential guidelines were revised to 
encourage self-regulation and covered codes of conduct for directors, chief executives and other 
employees; duties and responsibilities of directors, chief executives and management; duties and 
responsibilities of external auditors; and the definition of bad and doubtful advances and loans. 
In 1998 the Central Bank enhanced capital requirements to avoid a repeat of the banking 
crises experienced in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. To this end, the gearing ratio was raised to 
7.5% from 5%. In 2000, the Central Bank adopted the Basel I standards on capital adequacy. 
This led to the introduction of additional capital adequacy ratios of 8% and 12 % for core capital 
and total capital to risk weighted assets respectively. These reforms were in tandem with the then 
prevailing global trends that required financial institutions to maintain capital commensurate 
with the credit risk inherent in their business.  
In response to gaps identified in the 2003 joint IMF/ World Bank Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP), a series of legal and regulatory reforms have been undertaken.  
These have included significant changes to the Banking Act (Cap 488) and to prudential 
guidelines to strengthen arrangements in relation to bank licensing, corporate governance, capital 
adequacy, risk classification of assets and overall risk management.  
Deposit insurance is often seen as an integral part of a financial safety net, in spite of 
significant risks that both case studies and cross-country comparisons have shown (see 
Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002, for an overview).  While the initial purpose is to protect small 
savings and prevent bank runs, deposit insurance also reduces market discipline even further, as 7 
 
depositors have fewer incentives to properly monitor and discipline banks.  This results in 
additional pressure on supervisors, which in countries with a weak regulatory and supervisory 
framework can result in deposit insurance leading to more rather than less fragility (Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache, 2002).  Across countries with deposit insurance, structure, funding and 
mandates vary a lot. While some countries have pure pay-box deposit insurance funds, such as in 
Brazil and Uganda, other schemes have wide-ranging supervisory powers, such as in Canada or 
the U.S.  Deposit insurers might be more likely to carefully monitor banks and intervene rapidly 
into failing banks as they have to carry the costs in terms of higher pay-out to indemnified 
depositors.  Cross-country comparisons show indeed that banks in countries where the deposit 
insurer has the responsibility of intervening failed banks and the power to revoke membership in 
the deposit insurance scheme are more stable and less likely to become insolvent (Beck and 
Laeven, 2008). 
Following the banking crisis of 1985/86, Kenya established a Deposit Protection Fund 
Board (DPFB) with a wide mandate. Specifically, the DPFB’s main tasks are to manage the 
deposit insurance fund and carry out the liquidation of insolvent institutions once they have been 
closed by CBK (by repaying protected deposits and dividends, carrying out debt recovery, and 
winding up the institutions under liquidation). DFPB offers protection to small depositors up to 
Kshs 100,000 (USD 1,250) against loss of their savings in case of a bank failure. Institutionally, 
DFPB is part of CBK and relies on staff from CBK, but also on information from CBK’s 
supervisory department. It does not have any role in the supervisory process. While having a 
broad mandate, DFPB’s responsibilities are thus not completely aligned with its incentive to 
minimize insurance fund losses. 
In order to improve the role of the DPFB in enhancing depositor confidence, initiatives are 
underway to enact a new and separate Kenya Deposit Insurance Corporation Act that will give 
the Fund autonomy in its operations. Among other additional roles, the draft Act provides the 
DFPB with powers to request the Central Bank to carry out an inspection of a member institution 
and, where deemed necessary, to conduct the examination itself. 8 
 
3.  Soundness of Kenya’s Banking Sector 
Since 2000 there has been a significant improvement in financial stability, as indicated by the 
financial soundness indicators in Table 3.  The aggregate indicators, however, mask a significant 
variation across different ownership groups.  
Table 3.  Financial Soundness Indicators (%) 
    2000 2001 2002  2003  2004 2005  2006 2007  2008 
Regulatory capital to risk weighted assets  17.5  17.1  17.4  17.2  16.6  16.4  16.5  18.0  18.4 
Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets  14.2  14.5  14.1  14.7  16.3  16.0  16.4  16.8  16.2 
Non-performing loans to gross loans  37.2  39.4  39.6  34.9  29.3  25.6  21.3  10.9  8.4 
Non-performing loans net of provisions to total 
capital  78.7 78.8 77.8  60.7  52.7 40.1  28.6 15.1  10.8 
Return on Assets   0.5  1.6  1  2.3  2.1  2.4  2.8  3.0  2.9 
Return on equity   4.9  15.7  10.9  23.2  22.0  25.0  28.6  27.5  28.6 
Net interest income to gross income  42.1  43.6  43.8  50.5  50.7  50.2  50.2  50.1  48.3 
Non-interest expenses to gross income  65.4  58.6  66.9  62.9  63.9  55.7  52.8  50.8  48.7 
Liquid assets to total assets  29.5  34.4  33.7  33.2  32.4  33.1  30.5  35.1  34.6 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya  
Banks are generally well-capitalized with an overall capital adequacy ratio of 18 percent 
comparable or considerably above that in other emerging economies and above the 8% 
recommended by Basel Core Principles (Table 4).  Liquidity ratios have been maintained above 
the minimum statutory requirements while earnings measures have improved steadily.  
Significant improvement in the stability of the banking sector has been reflected in asset quality. 
The banking sector experienced high levels of non-performing loans for many years averaging 
about 30% of gross advances before year 2003. However, the ratio declined significantly to stand 
at 8.4% as of December 2008. Notwithstanding this improvement, this ratio is still significantly 
higher than in other emerging markets as of 2007 (Table 4).  A big proportion of the NPLs are 
concentrated in a few government-owned and –influenced banks as well as other adequately 
capitalized banks. Banks have passed significant provisions onto their books, thanks to strict 
prudential requirements, and hence the high level of NPLs does not pose a systemic threat to the 
Kenyan banking system.  9 
 
Table 4.  Comparator Countries: Financial Soundness Indicators, 2007 (%) 
Country CAR  NPLs  Ratio
4  Return on Assets  Return on Equity 
Brazil
5 17.4  4.4 2.3  24.5 
Indonesia
6   19.2  16  2.6  28 
Malaysia
7 12.7  8.7  1.3  14.1 
Nigeria 18.6  7.7 1.8  13.8 
South Africa
8 12.7  1.1  1.4  18.6 
Kenya  18.0 10.9 3.0  27.5 
Sources: Central Bank of Kenya, Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), and IMF, GFSR. 
Stress tests confirm the resilience of Kenya’s banking system. Table 5 below shows stress 
tests conducted using individual bank data from December 2008 to assess the impact of credit 
risk using two shocks. The first evaluates a deteriorating loan portfolio that would result in an 
increase in provisions by 50% and 100%, while the second assesses the impact of migrating 25% 
and 50% of performing loans to the substandard category. The results indicate that on the whole, 
banks appear resilient to the shocks measured. However, the most significant impact would be 
felt if a riskier client base resulted in a 100% increase in provisions. Such a significant shock 
would result in 17 banks (accounting for 24 percent of assets) failing to meet minimum capital 
requirements. Four of these banks would be insolvent. These results could be seen as providing a 
justification for increasing minimum capital requirements.  
                                                            
4 NPLs to gross loans for Nigeria, Kenya and Malaysia. NPLs to total loans for all others. 
5 CAR, NPL for 2005, ROA and ROE for March 2006. 
6 CAR Sept. 2006; NPLs include compromised assets ratio, restructured loans, and foreclosed assets for the largest 
16 banks. ROE is based on the largest 12 banks. 
7 ROA is before tax.  
8 All entries are for March 2007. 10 
 
Table 5.  Sensitivity to Credit Risk 







Provisions increase by  Migration to NPLs of 
50% 100%  25%  of 
Performing Loans 
50% of Performing 
Loans 
Peer Group – Large  18.3    17.1  15.3 18.0  17.8 
Peer Group - 
Medium  
18.7 15.0  11.1  18.1  17.6 
Peer Group - Small   35.2 32.5  29.6  34.7  34.2 
          
# Banks with CAR 
<12% 
0 11  17  2  3 
Share of Assets  0 20  24.0  5.1  12.3 
          
# Banks with CAR 
<0% 
0 1  4  0  0 
Share of Assets  0 0.99  2.2  0  0 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya data 
4.  Banking Sector Efficiency 
In this section we describe how interest spreads, our proxy for the efficiency of financial 
intermediation, have evolved over the past ten years in Kenya, and relate those developments to 
our discussion of the government strategy for the development of the financial sector and the 
accompanying changes in the legal and regulatory framework discussed above. We then present 
simple arithmetic decompositions of the interest spreads to explain the factors that have 
contributed to their relatively high levels and also to their decline over time. We also examine 
how spread levels and their determinants differ by bank size and ownership type. Finally, we 
offer regressions that better enable us to test whether the determinants of spreads differ by bank 
ownership type and if such differences can be explained by the types of activities that different 
owners pursue. 
Headline indicators produced by the Central Bank of Kenya indicate that spreads 
declined from 1999 to 2003 and have since remained stable (Figure 1). The relatively sharp 
decline in spreads in 2003 owes much to improvements in Kenya’s fiscal situation and general 
macro-management, which led to substantial declines in both the volume of government 
securities issued and the interest rates paid. As government securities became a less attractive 
investment option for banks, they turned to new lending opportunities, and the competition 11 
 
between banks for those opportunities coincided with lower spreads. However, the shift out of 
government securities was much swifter for some banks than others, and most banks increased 
their holdings of those securities from 2004 to 2005. In addition, yearly average spreads in 
Figure 1 mask wide variation across banks and our statistical analysis below indicates that the 
drivers of changes in spreads differ across bank ownership types. For these reasons, the reduction 
in government debt issuance does not provide a complete explanation of the evolution of spreads 
over this period.   
Figure 1 
 
Source: Data are from Central Bank of Kenya Statistical Bulletin, June 2008. The lending rate is the weighted 
average of commercial banks’ interest rates on loans and advances. Similarly, the deposit rate is weighted average 
rate paid by commercial banks on savings deposits. For 2006 and 2007, we use the December figures. For 2008, we 
use the June figures (latest available). 
Further indication that the decline in spreads is not wholly attributable to macroeconomic 
stability and improved management of government debt comes from simple arithmetic 
decompositions of interest spreads. In the decomposition exercise we follow the method used in 
Beck and Fuchs (2004), subtracting the interest rate paid for deposits from the interest rates 
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interest income earned to interest in suspense, and divide that sum by total loans.
9 Because this 
measure captures interest income and interest that was accrued but not collected, it is our best 
proxy for the ex-ante interest rates charged on loans by banks. The interest spread is then 
calculated as the difference between that figure and the interest expense paid on deposits 
(divided by total deposits). The spreads in our analysis are therefore a weighted average for the 
banking sector as a whole (rather than a simple average across banks). 
We decompose the spreads into its different components. Banks charge higher interest 
rates to riskier borrowers in anticipation of defaults, and so we therefore account for loan loss 
provisions in the decomposition. We also account for overhead costs, taxes, and required 
reserves, all factors that contribute to higher spreads. The overhead costs are those attributable to 
loans, which we identify by calculating the share of loan interest revenue in total revenue. Profit 
margin is a residual after adjusting for loan loss provisions, the tax rate, reserve requirements, 
and overheads.
10  
Using the ex-post constructed spreads across banks shows a different development over 
time than the headline indicators. Table 6, Panel A shows that spreads declined for the sector as a 
whole, but not until much later in the period than was indicated in Figure 1, which is based on 
the ex-ante interest rates charged by banks rather than the ex-post interest earned and accrued 
that we rely on in this analysis.  The reason for this discrepancy is that until 2006 the interest in 
suspense for the government-owned banks (Cooperative, Consolidated, KCB, and NBK) was 
much higher than for privately-owned banks because of their huge overhang of non-performing 
loans. Our method for calculating interest spreads can yield misleading results for banks with 
large stocks of non-performing loans. When we drop those government-owned banks from the 
sample in Table 6, Panel B, the evolution of spreads looks very similar to that in Figure 1, except 
that declines occurred about a year later. This is because the ex-post spreads reflect the ex-ante 
                                                            
9 Interest accrued but not collected from the date an account is classified as non-performing is included as interest in 
suspense. 
10  The formula we use is: 
Profit margin = (1-tax rate) x (weighted average lending rate – weighted average deposit rate/(1 – Reserve 
Requirement) – operating costs/loans – loan loss provisions/loans) 
The tax rate is calculated from actual tax payments. The reserve requirement is 10%. Operating costs are those 
attributable to lending, and thus are equal to the share of income from lending multiplied by total costs. 13 
 
rates charged on loans at a lag. In all, however, our ex-post calculated spreads for private banks 
match up well with the headline indicators produced by Central Bank of Kenya, which are based 
on ex-ante interest rates charged by banks. 
Table 6.  Decomposition of Interest Spreads Over Time 
Panel A. All Banks  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Average Lending Rate  25.03  24.47  25.89 24.64 21.45 22.75 12.22 12.19 
Average  Deposit  Rate  5.79 4.62 3.53 2.00 1.36 2.60 2.57 2.41 
Spread  19.25 19.85 22.36 22.64 20.10 20.16  9.66  9.78 
Overhead  Costs  6.94 6.49 7.53 6.60 5.83 5.99 3.10 3.16 
Loan-loss  Provisions  4.28 2.66 3.43 2.68 2.02 1.68 1.64 0.85 
Reserve  Requirement  0.64 0.51 0.39 0.22 0.15 0.29 0.29 0.27 
Taxes  2.21 3.05 3.30 3.94 3.63 3.66 1.39 1.65 
Profit  Margin  5.16 7.12 7.71 9.20 8.47 8.54 3.24 3.85 
          
Panel B. Private Banks  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Average Lending Rate  20.72  19.63  17.65 15.77 12.92 13.78 13.77 12.98 
Average  Deposit  Rate  5.29 4.60 3.36 2.14 1.47 2.78 2.88 2.79 
Spread  15.44 15.03 14.29 13.64 11.46 11.00 10.89 10.19 
Overhead  Costs  4.86 4.66 4.85 3.75 3.05 3.24 3.15 3.00 
Loan-loss  Provisions  3.01 1.89 1.76 2.77 1.93 1.32 1.08 0.68 
Reserve  Requirement  0.59 0.51 0.37 0.24 0.16 0.31 0.32 0.31 
Taxes  2.09 2.39 2.19 2.06 1.90 1.84 1.90 1.86 
Profit  Margin  4.89 5.58 5.12 4.82 4.42 4.29 4.44 4.34 
Source: Own calculations, based on CBK data 
The effects of the government’s program for the development of the banking sector are 
reflected in both the decline in spreads and their determinants. The decomposition for privately-
owned banks (both domestic and foreign) in Panel B shows a steady decline in the interest rates 
charged on loans and a substantial reduction in the interest rate paid for deposits. The decline in 
lending rates is consistent with greater competition, while the drop in deposit rates likely reflects 14 
 
both the improvements in bank soundness indicators summarized in section 4 and the increasing 
confidence of depositors. 
The decomposition in panel B points to a number of specific factors that contributed to 
the reduction in the spreads of the private banks. First, productive efficiency appears to have 
improved as reflected in the steady decline in overhead costs (relative to total loans). Second, the 
quality of loan portfolios improved as reflected in lower provisions for bad debts. Reserve 
requirements and taxes have seen more moderate declines, though neither was among the more 
important components of spreads as reflected in the decomposition. Despite the substantial 
declines in overhead costs and loan-loss provisioning, which should improve profitability, banks’ 
profit margins declined in the middle of the period, and have remained more or less steady since. 
This too points to an increasingly competitive private banking sector. 
Stratifying the sample of private banks based on size (total deposits) reveals that larger 
banks generally tend to have lower interest spreads, which in part reflects the gradual decline in 
overhead costs as bank size increases (Table 7). At the same time, the decompositions reveal that 
banks in the largest size quartile are distinct from those in the other three in important respects. 
For example, provisioning charges are very similar for banks in the lowest three quartiles, but 
less than half of that level for banks in the top quartile. Also, the banks in the top quartile charge 
substantially lower rates on their loans and pay much lower rates on deposits.  While their 
spreads are lower than other banks, so too are their profit margins indicating that they operate in 
a relatively competitive market niche. Banks in the third largest size quartile have spreads and 
margins that are closest to those of the largest banks, while those in quartile 2 and, especially, the 
bottom quartile charge the highest rates on loans and interest spreads, but also have higher profit 
margins. Based on the available data, it is difficult to know whether those high margins are due 
to a less competitive market niche or our less-than-perfect method for calculating spreads. Again, 
for banks with a large stock of nonperforming loans, this method could yield misleading results. 15 
 
Table 7.  Spread Decomposition by Size Quartile, Ranking Based on 2007 Deposits 














Average Lending Rate  28.97  14.21  18.91  10.46 
Average  Deposit  Rate  4.23 3.79 4.63 2.16 
Spread 24.74  10.42  14.28  8.30 
Overhead  Costs  7.65 4.15 3.96 2.38 
Loan-loss  Provisions  1.33 1.26 1.19 0.45 
Reserve  Requirement  0.47 0.42 0.51 0.24 
Taxes  4.59 1.38 2.58 1.57 
Profit  Margin  10.70  3.22 6.03 3.66 
Source: Own calculations, based on CBK data. Note: Cooperative, Consolidated, and KCB, and NBK are 
excluded from these calculations. 
The pattern in Table 7 suggests that the largest private banks are more efficient, as 
reflected in their overhead costs, and more stable, as reflected in their loan-loss provisions. For 
these reasons, proposals to increase minimum capital requirements and thereby consolidate the 
sector by creating larger banks are being explored. Section 6 discusses this issue in greater detail. 
While the size of private banks appears to have an effect on the efficiency of financial 
intermediation, bank ownership plays at least as important a role in explaining the relative 
efficiency of Kenyan banks. Table 8 shows why, namely because the figures for government 
owned and government influenced banks are not reliable. Recall that our method for calculating 
spreads is less reliable for banks that have a large stock of non-performing loans. This is likely 
because interest is accrued on the same non-performing loan multiple times. In short, our method 
makes sense for banks that are pricing loans to cover the expected future costs of defaults.  
And so the enormous lending rates and spreads calculated for government banks is the 
first tip-off that they are not adhering even remotely to commercial banking principles, though 
we concede that the difficulties appear to be more severe for government-owned than 
government-influenced banks. At the same time, our spreads were increasing for all government 
banks from 2000 to 2005. During this same period, spreads were declining substantially for the 16 
 
private domestic and foreign banks. So the general decline in spreads in Figure 1 cannot be 
attributable to the government banks. 
Table 8.  Spread Decomposition by Ownership Type 
 





  2000 2005 2007 2000 2005 2007 2000 2005 2007 2000 2005 2007 
Average Lending Rate  16.61  11.21  10.46 21.30 14.90 16.75 46.34 65.59 27.91 25.86 23.57 27.01
Average  Deposit  Rate  3.76 1.83 2.09 7.42 4.15 3.81 6.13 2.59 2.08 7.89 2.07 1.20 
Spread  12.85 9.38  8.36 13.88 10.75 12.94 40.21 63.00 25.83  17.97  21.50 25.81
Overhead  Costs  4.11 2.50 2.40 4.37 3.68 3.80  20.92 18.32 9.37 8.71 8.31 9.25 
Loan-loss  Provisions  2.90 1.37 0.55 3.60 1.22 0.85 3.94 2.66 2.21 6.54 2.04 1.21 
Reserve  Requirement  0.42 0.20 0.23 0.82 0.46 0.42 0.68 0.29 0.23 0.88 0.23 0.13 
Taxes  1.62 1.59 1.55 1.53 1.62 2.36 4.40  12.52 4.21 0.55 3.28 4.56 
Profit  Margin  3.79 3.71 3.62 3.57 3.77 5.50  10.27 29.21 9.81 1.29 7.65  10.65
Source: Own calculations, based on CBK data 
In 2007, the spreads of the government-owned banks declined steeply, yet this is 
certainly due to the large injection of capital into NBK, which was used to clean up its large 
overhang of non-performing loans. NBK is by far the largest majority government-owned bank, 
and thus the injection has a sizable effect on the spreads for that ownership category. Even with 
the injection, the spreads for government-owned banks remain substantially above those for 
private banks, while those for the government-influenced banks are roughly similar. And the 
spreads for the government-influenced banks were actually increasing from 2005 to 2007.  
It is also worth noting that both types of government banks pay less for their deposits 
than do private banks. This suggests that depositors are certain that they will be bailed out 
regardless of problems with the loan portfolios of these banks. Since these banks still comprise a 
large share of the banking sector (Table 2), this situation implies substantial misallocation of 
investable resources (savings). In addition, the existence of large government banks no doubt has 
a distortionary impact on the activities of private banks which could be effectively precluded 17 
 
from pursuing efficiency enhancement in some geographic areas or offering a wider array of 
services. For all of these reasons, ownership restructuring including privatization would appear 
to be a major remaining priority for the reform agenda of the Kenyan banking sector. 
The general picture from Table 8 is that foreign banks have shown steady improvement 
in efficiency (lower spreads and overhead costs), while private domestic banks have seen a slight 
reversal in recent years. Table 8 also spotlights the persistence of the relative inefficiency of the 
government-owned and government-influenced banks. As noted above, from 2000 to 2005 
spreads declined for private banks, but after that the paths of the foreign and private domestic 
banks diverged, with foreign banks continuing the decline through 2007 and private domestic 
banks showing an increase. This is partly due to the lending rate that we calculate for private 
banks, which increased substantially from 2005 to 2007 due to jumps in interest in suspense for 
some banks. Because the private domestic banks tend to be smaller than the foreign banks, one 
could view this as additional support for fostering consolidation among some of those banks. 
The increase in spreads for private domestic banks from 2005 to 2007 is accounted for by 
interest in suspense and the slight increase in overhead costs during that period. The government-
owned banks also saw steep declines in overhead costs from 2005 to 2007, consistent with some 
improvement in their efficiency, though their levels remained well above those for the foreign 
and private domestic banks. For the government-influenced banks, overhead costs remained 
stable and high relative to the private banks. Charges for loan loss provisions declined for all 
banks, though the declines for the foreign and government-influenced banks were steeper than 
for the government-owned and private domestic banks (Table 8).  
Lurking in the background of this simple analysis of spreads are issues of market 
segmentation. Clearly, higher spreads, margins, and interest rates charged on loans for the 
private domestic banks could be consistent with the notion that those banks serve a market niche 
of relatively riskier borrowers.  The stratification by bank size also indicates that smaller banks, 
many of which have private domestic ownership, occupy a market niche where interest rates and 
spreads tend to be higher. By contrast, the profit margins and spreads of the largest banks, many 
of which are foreign-owned are substantially lower, indicating that they operate in a more 
competitive niche. This type of segmentation has implications for the discussion of sector 18 
 
consolidation below. To the extent that the smaller private banks and larger foreign banks 
operate in different market niches, the consolidation of the private domestic banks could lead to 
over-saturation of the market for top-end borrowers and reductions in services for the less-than-
blue-chip customers of the private domestic banks. 
Spread Regressions 
Regressions enable us to assess the relationship between spreads and a number of additional 
bank characteristics that could affect interest spreads and to better pinpoint the banks and their 
activities that were responsible for the decline in spreads. The regression model is based on that 
in Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) for developing countries in Latin America and in Beck and 
Hesse (2009) for Uganda:
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where the interest spread is calculated as described above for bank i at time t. Overheads are the 
ratio of overhead costs to total assets. As in the simple decomposition, we expect that higher 
overheads costs are passed on to borrowers in the form of higher spreads. Liquidity is the ratio of 
liquid assets (cash and deposits with other banks) to deposits, while equity is bank capital plus 
reserves over total assets, both of which we can expect to be positively associated with spreads, 
given the opportunity costs.
12  Provisions are the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans, our 
measure of portfolio quality. As described above, we expect that higher loan provisions reflect 
riskier borrowers, which raises ex-ante interest rates charged on loans resulting in higher 
calculate spreads. Market share is the bank’s share of total banking sector deposits, our measure 
                                                            
11 That model is motivated by the dealership model of banks spreads developed in Ho and Saunders (1981), in which 
banks are risk-averse dealers trying to balance loan and deposit markets. Because loan requests and deposit flows 
can be asynchronous, spreads are seen as fees charged by banks for the provision of liquidity under uncertainty. See 
Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) for further description of the model and extensions by other authors. 
12 In the Latin American context, high liquidity was thought to inflict a cost on banks, since a bank must forego the 
opportunity to hold a higher-yielding instrument. Thus, Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) hypothesize that banks will 
try to transfer this cost to borrowers, resulting in a positive association between liquidity and spreads. Similarly, 
those authors hypothesize that there is an opportunity cost associated with holding excessive capital, and thus they 
expect a positive relation between capital and spreads. 19 
 
of bank size. To the extent that larger banks can take advantage of economies of scale, we would 
expect market share to be negatively related to spreads.
13  
We control for bank orientation using interest income, the ratio of total interest income to 
operating income, and intermediation, the ratio of net loans and advances to total liabilities. 
Using bank-level data across countries, Laeven and Levine (2007) demonstrate that specialized 
loan-making banks have different performance characteristics than specialized investment banks, 
and that loan-making banks tend to have a higher share of interest income. We expect 
competitive pressure in the lending market to be better reflected in the banks specialized in that 
area, and thus we expect a negative association between interest income and spreads. Similarly, 
we expect those banks that lend a relatively high share of their available liabilities to be most 
responsive to the same competitive pressures, and thus a negative relation between 
intermediation and spreads. 
Following the literature, in some specifications we include a control for banking sector 
structure and three macroeconomic control variables. Herfindahl is a standard index of sector 
concentration, which we calculated based on bank shares of total deposits.
14  If deposits are 
concentrated in the hands of a few banks, those banks might be able to drive up lending rates, as 
they control the supply of funds. We would therefore expect a positive relation between 
concentration and spreads. The macroeconomic controls are the T-bill rate, inflation, and real 
growth. The T-bill rate is the rate of interest on short-term treasury bills, which is included as a 
proxy for the marginal cost of funds faced by banks. Inflation is included because price shocks 
might not be passed through equally to the nominal lending and borrowing rates, and thus these 
differential effects would be reflected in the spread. Real growth is included to capture business 
cycle effects that are reflected in spreads. As an economy slumps and growth slows, borrowers 
become less creditworthy, and thus banks must charge higher lending rates, which are then 
reflected in higher spreads (all else equal). 
                                                            
13 This is consistent with some of the regression results in Beck and Hesse (2009) for Uganda from 2000 to 2004. 
Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) note, however, that market share could also be equated with market power, and 
thus the ability to charge higher rates on the loans. The coefficient on this variable will therefore indicate which of 
these two hypotheses is better supported by the data. 
14 The index is calculated by summing the squared market shares of all banks. 20 
 
Finally, we control for ownership type.  Private domestic is a dummy variable equal to 
one if a bank is owned by private Kenyan interests, while Government is a dummy equal to one 
if a bank is owned by the Kenyan government. In some models, we further differentiate between 
banks that are majority-owned by the government and those in which the government owns only 
a minority stake (which we call ‘government-influenced’ banks). The coefficients on these 
ownership variables are therefore intended to capture any differences in spreads relative to banks 
owned by foreign interests (our omitted ownership category) that are not accounted for by the 
other explanatory variables.  
The base results in Table 9 suggest that overhead costs are the driving factor of interest 
rate spreads. Both models are estimated via OLS, and model 2 includes bank-specific fixed 
effects.
15 In model 2, the estimated coefficients therefore reflect departures from each bank’s 
average spread for the period.  The main results from the base models is that spreads are highly 
sensitive to overhead costs: the estimated coefficient indicates that a one percentage point 
increase in the ratio of overheads to total assets is associated with a 1.8 percentage point increase 
in interest spreads. The fixed effects models also indicate that increases in equity and provisions 
for loan losses were associated with higher spreads during this period, while an increase in the 
intermediation ratio was associated with lower spreads. All of these results are in line with our 
hypotheses.    
                                                            
15 In model 1, standard errors are clustered at the bank level. 21 
 
 
Table 9.  Base Interest Spreads Regressions 
Explanatory Variable  OLS  Fixed effects 
 (1)  (2) 
Overheads 1.7680***  1.7510*** 
   (0.6352)  (0.3350) 
Equity -0.0061  0.2065** 
   (0.0198)  (0.0876) 
Liquidity 0.0301  -0.0080 
   (0.0416)  (0.0367) 
Loan-loss provisions  -0.0910  0.3761** 
   (0.2540)  (0.1740) 
Market share  -0.1577  0.4170 
   (0.1439)  (0.5112) 
Interest income  -0.1314  -0.0121 
   (0.1255)  (0.0867) 
Intermediation -0.0499  -0.1363** 
   (0.0475)  (0.0598) 
Herfindahl index  -0.0425  0.0657 
   (1.0109)  (1.1181) 
Real T-bills rate  0.1362  0.0611 
   (0.1529)  (0.1206) 
Inflation 0.1676  -0.0294 
   (0.2909)  (0.2532) 
Real Growth  -0.0058  0.1482 
   (0.2583)  (0.3309) 
Private Domestic  0.0211*    
   (0.0120)    
Government owned  0.0126    
   (0.1057)    
Government-influenced 0.0525     
   (0.0362)    
Constant 0.2064  0.1274 
   (0.1348)  (0.1541) 
Observations 327  327 
Number of banks  45  45 
Adjusted R2  0.5634  0.7295 
Source: Own calculations, based on CBK data 
The Table 10 results show that the significant results from our base models are not a 
reflection of the banking sector as a whole, but are rather driven by specific subsets of banks. To 
see this, we re-run the base models in Table 9 with interaction terms for each of the three 
ownership categories that appeared in the original regression (private domestic, government-
owned, and government-influenced). In this way the association between each explanatory 
variable and the interest spread is allowed to differ by ownership type. The coefficients on the 
non-interacted variables therefore summarize the effects for foreign banks, our omitted 
ownership category. Rather than present the full specification, we present the effect of each 22 
 
variable on the spreads of each bank ownership type. What appears in Table 10 is the coefficient 
for each variable for each ownership category and a test of whether the coefficient is different 
from zero. P-values appear in parentheses below the coefficients.  
The results in Table 10 enable us to further pinpoint the type of banks that are responsible 
for the significant relationships in our base regressions. In Panel A, which summarizes the results 
from the OLS model, the positive relationship between overhead costs and interest spreads is 
much stronger for foreign banks. The relationship for all bank types is significant, but the 
coefficients are smaller, especially for the government-owned and private domestic banks. 
Similarly, only the interest spreads of the foreign banks are significantly associated with the 
intermediation ratio, the real T-bills rate, and inflation, and this holds for both the OLS and fixed 
effects regressions.   
The determinants of the interest spreads of the foreign banks are much closer to what 
would be expected based on the existing empirical literature from other countries than are those 
of the other bank types.  For example, aside from the overhead costs variable, none of the other 
variables is strongly associated with the interest spreads of the private domestic banks. There is 
some weak evidence from the fixed effects models that higher equity ratios and loans loss 
provisions were associated with higher spreads for private domestic banks, but those variables 
are only significant at the ten percent level.  Similarly, in the fixed effects models, which are our 
best tool for assessing the changes in spreads, none of the variables is significant for the 
government-owned and government-influenced banks expect for the aforementioned overhead 
costs and the equity variable. The significant equity coefficients reflect most likely spurious 
correlation rather than a causal link, a reflection of the government’s re-capitalization strategy 
for these banks. For example, the positive coefficient on Equity for government-owned banks in 
the fixed effects regressions is because of the large capital infusion into NBK, a bank which 
happens to have high interest spreads. The infusion of equity did not cause NBK’s spreads to 
increase. Lackluster performance and a high share of non-performing assets were already 
reflected in high spreads. The capital infusion occurred as a result of those factors. 23 
 
Table 10.  Determinants of Interest Spreads, By Bank Ownership Type 
Panel A. OLS  Foreign Private    Government  Government- 
   Domestic  Owned  Influenced 
Overheads 3.6074***  1.7806*  1.0115**  2.8742*** 
   (0.7355)  [0.0924]  [0.0420]  [0.0000] 
Equity -0.1384  -0.0237  0.7840***  -1.6306*** 
   (0.0952)  [0.3454]  [0.0000]  [0.0083] 
Liquidity 0.0434*  0.0343  -0.0322  0.1203 
   (0.0239)  [0.5188]  [0.6371]  [0.4475] 
Loan-loss provisions  -0.3046  -0.1359  -0.0541  0.4891 
   (0.2189)  [0.5621]  [0.9405]  [0.1792] 
Market share  0.0818  -0.8175  2.4479***  -0.9582** 
   (0.0706)  [0.2280]  [0.0000]  [0.0328] 
Interest income  0.0728*  -0.2983  -0.4491***  -0.0508 
   (0.0379)  [0.2033]  [0.0001]  [0.7614] 
Intermediation -0.1043**  -0.0193  0.0284  -0.0967 
   (0.0447)  [0.7574]  [0.7369]  [0.5984] 
Herfindahl index  0.4067  0.8696  -1.8256  0.1929 
   (0.9961)  [0.3934]  [0.7554]  [0.9615] 
Real T-bills rate  0.1527**  0.1368  -0.2494  0.0280 
   (0.0588)  [0.3853]  [0.8504]  [0.9000] 
Inflation 0.2958**  0.2637  -1.9958  0.3035 
   (0.1438)  [0.2640]  [0.4841]  [0.6907] 
Real Growth  -0.1566  0.4587  0.2042  0.1894 
   (0.2041)  [0.3661]  [0.8282]  [0.7451] 
        
Panel B. Fixed Effects  Foreign Private    Government  Government- 
   Domestic  Owned  Influenced 
Overheads 3.3104***  2.0472***  1.1984***  2.6637*** 
   (0.7093)  [0.0017]  [0.0016]  [0.0000] 
Equity 0.0317  0.2325*  0.9098**  -2.2986** 
   (0.1131)  [0.0535]  [0.0115]  [0.0229] 
Liquidity 0.0048  -0.0233  -0.0171  0.5983* 
   (0.0239)  [0.7940]  [0.8802]  [0.0869] 
Loan-loss provisions  -0.2050  0.4047*  0.1487  0.7378 
   (0.2746)  [0.0794]  [0.9216]  [0.2785] 
Market share  0.1116  1.6164  -6.4134  0.2384 
   (0.3982)  [0.1383]  [0.2800]  [0.7720] 
Interest income  -0.0099  0.0575  -0.3730  -0.1859 
   (0.0692)  [0.7782]  [0.3980]  [0.4070] 
Intermediation -0.1191**  -0.1326  0.0568  0.4690 
   (0.0496)  [0.1410]  [0.7807]  [0.2786] 
Herfindahl index  0.1924  0.9183  2.1135  0.6619 
   (0.8472)  [0.5494]  [0.8070]  [0.8218] 
Real T-bills rate  0.2200**  0.0907  0.3199  -0.1687 
   (0.1060)  [0.5866]  [0.7339]  [0.6623] 
Inflation 0.3849*  0.0639  -0.7747  -0.1773 
   (0.1988)  [0.8500]  [0.6889]  [0.8185] 
Real Growth  -0.2113  0.4306  0.8667  -0.1336 
   (0.2435)  [0.3537]  [0.6850]  [0.9085] 
Source: Own calculations, based on CBK data 24 
 
The general conclusion from the interest spread regressions is that reductions in 
overheads led to lower spreads for all banks during this period, but the results were especially 
pronounced for the foreign-owned banks. Other factors such as the reduction in the T-bill rate 
and lower inflation also contributed to lower spreads during this period, but those reductions 
were only significant for the foreign banks. The regressions therefore indicate that the lion’s 
share of the sectoral reduction in interest spreads that we began this analysis with (Figure 1) is 
attributable to the foreign banks. Moreover, the lack of significant results for the other ownership 
types suggests either that they are competing in a separate market niche (as seems likely for 
many of the private domestic banks) or that they are pursuing some of the same clients as foreign 
banks but pricing loans in a less rationale way (as seems likely for the government-influenced 
banks). 
5.  Access to Financial Services 
FinAccess 2006 and FinAccess 2009, two household surveys, conducted by the Financial Sector 
Development Trust Kenya jointly with the Central Bank of Kenya, confirm three previously-
assumed conclusions about access to financial services: (a) a large proportion of the Kenyan 
population has no access to financial services, whether formal or informal; (b) there is a general 
tendency for access to services from formal and semi-formal providers (banks, SACCOs, and 
MFIs) to decline as one goes from urban to rural, from high-income to low-income, and from 
better-educated to not educated; and, (c) although the percentage of the population that is served 
is similar in urban and rural districts, the mix of those services is different.
16 In urban areas, 
respondents rely more heavily on services from banks and semi-formal sources (SACCOs and 
MFIs) while in rural districts, there is greater reliance on services provided via informal groups. 
Table 11 shows that the use of formal financial services in Kenya is at similar levels as in 
other East African countries, but below that in several countries in Southern Africa. As the 
surveys are not completely consistent across countries, we follow Porteous (2007) in his 
definition of formal bank and bank-like financial services, which varies from the definition to be 
                                                            
16 The discussion of the findings of FinAccess 2006 and 2009 is based on Beck (2009).  25 
 
used in the remainder of this section.
17 Here we show the share of population that (i) uses formal 
bank services, (ii) uses other formal financial but not bank services, (iii) uses only informal 
financial services, and (iv) does not use any financial services.   Kenya has a higher share of 
population using formal financial services (21.5%) than Tanzania and Uganda, but also Zambia, 
where this proportion is below 20%, but a lower share than in Botswana, Namibia and South 
Africa, where this share is above 40%.  The share of population that uses non-bank formal but 
not bank services is relatively high (with 15%) – mostly driven by M-Pesa -- and higher than in 
the other African countries for which we have such data. The share of population that is 
completely excluded from any formal or informal financial service is lower in Kenya (34%) than 
any other country except for South Africa, suggestive of the strong role that informal and other 
formal arrangements play in Kenya.   
Table 11.  Use of Financial Services across Africa 
 Formal 
Formal, 
other Informal  Excluded 
Kenya 21.5  15  29.5  34 
Tanzania  15 2 7 75 
Uganda 18  0  29  52 
Zambia  14 12 11  62 
Botswana 44 5 5 48 
South 
Africa  54 6 9 31 
Namibia  53 3 1 42 
Source: Porteous (2007) and Beck (2009) 
 
Table 12.  Use of Financial Services in Kenya, over Time and across Different Groups  
  2006 2009  2009 
 overall  Overall  female  male  Urban  rural  none  primary  secondary  tertiary 
Bank 18.5  22.6  17.8  27.8  40.9  17.6  4.9  13.4  34.7  70.2 
Formal-
other 8.1  17.9  15.9  20.2  21.5  17  7.2  16.6  25  19.5 
Informal 35  26.8  33.3  19.5  16.4  29.6  32  35.8  15.2  2.2 
Excluded 38.3  32.7  33  32.4  21.1  35.8  55.9  34.2 25.1 8 
Source: Beck (2009). Definitions: see text. 
                                                            
17 Porteous (2007) classifies banks and Postbank as formal and insurance companies and formal money transfer 
operators, such as M-Pesa, as non-bank formal.  SACCOs and MFIs, on the other hand, are classified as informal 
financial institutions. In the FinAccess definitions for Kenya, as reported in Table 12, on the other hand, SACCOs 
and MFIs are classified as other formal providers.  26 
 
Table 12 shows that the access frontier has been pushed out between 2006 and 2009, 
especially due to an increase in the users of other formal financial services. While in 2006, 
18.5% of the population used formal financial services – banks, the PostBank and insurance 
companies – 22.6% do so in 2009. The share of the population that uses only other formal 
financial services – MFIs, SACCOs, M-PESA and other formal money transfer operators– 
increased from 8.1% in 2006 to 17.9% in 2009. On the other hand, the proportion of the 
population with access to only informal financial services, decreased from 35% to 26.8% and the 
share of the population excluded from any financial service decreased from 38.3% to 32.7%.   
Table 12 also confirms significant differences in the use of financial services across 
different subgroups.  Men are more likely to use formal banking services, while women are more 
likely to be restricted to informal financial services. Financial exclusion, on the other hand, is at 
similar levels for men and women. Urban Kenyans are more than twice as likely to use formal 
financial services as rural Kenyans, while the share of Kenyans restricted to informal financial 
services or completely excluded is almost twice as high in rural as in urban areas.  Finally, we 
note a strong positive correlation of the use of formal financial services with the level of 
education. The gap between groups at different levels of educational attainment is starkest for 
Kenyans with tertiary education compared to all other groups. Only 10% of this segment is either 
limited to informal finance or excluded from any financial service. 
Savings and transaction services are the most prevalent financial services, while there is 
very limited use of credit and insurance services.  Table 13 reports the use of different financial 
services provided by banks and other formal financial institutions (SACCOs, MFIs and money 
transfer operators, including M-Pesa) in 2006 and 2009, as well as for different subgroups of the 
population in 2009.  We see that less than 10% of the population uses credit or insurance service, 
while one in four Kenyans uses savings services. The share of Kenyans using transaction 
services has increased dramatically over the past three years, mostly due to M-Pesa, a cell-phone 
based transaction service offered by Safaricom, a telecom and thus non-financial corporation. 
Comparing male and female Kenyans, we see that men are more likely to use all financial 
services than women.  The differences are even starker between rural and urban Kenya, with the 
use of transaction, savings and credit services almost twice as high in urban as in rural areas and 
the use of insurance services almost three times as high. 27 
 
  
Table 13.  Use of Different Financial Services in Kenya 
  2006 2009  2009 
 overall    Overall  female  Male  Urban  rural 
Transaction 15  45.2  40.7  50.2  71.6  38.1 
Savings 25.6  27  21.2  33.4  40.7  23.2 
Insurance 5.9  6.8  6  8.2  14.1  4.8 
Credit 6.7  7.3  4.7  9.1  10.3  6.2 
Source: Beck (2009). For detailed definitions, see Source. 
The entry of M-Pesa into the remittance market has been powerful and has been behind 
the increase in the use of transaction services.  39.9% of those surveyed claim to have used M-
Pesa, more than the users of any other financial institution or product in Kenya. The popularity 
of M-Pesa is also reflected in Kenyans’ perceptions. While in 2006, a relative (weighted) 
majority of those surveyed named ‘specialist money transfer operator’ as the least risky and 
fastest channel to send remittances and friends and family as the least expensive and easiest to 
obtain, in 2009 it was M-Pesa that was rated the least risky, the fastest and the easiest to obtain, 
while it came in as second under the category least expensive (friends and family continue to be 
rated as the least expensive channel). 
While many individual characteristics are associated with the use of financial services, 
many of these characteristics are also correlated with each other.  For example, inhabitants of 
rural areas are typically poorer and less likely to work in formal jobs – which of these 
characteristics is the decisive one explaining whether an individual has access to financial 
services or not?   In order to determine the decisive factors, we utilize multivariate regression 
analysis. Specifically, we regress dummy variables that indicate whether an individual has (i) 
access to banking services, (ii) other formal financial services, (iii) informal financial services, or 
(iv) is excluded.
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The regression results in Table 14 suggest that controlling for other characteristics, 
women are not less likely to use formal banking or other formal financial services, but they are 
more likely to use informal services than men and are less likely to be excluded.   Rural 
                                                            
18 Unlike in Tables 10 through 13, individuals can therefore belong to several categories. 28 
 
Kenyans, on the other hand, are less likely to use formal banking and other formal financial 
services, but not informal services.   Income is one of the strongest predictors of usage of both 
formal and informal financial services.  To illustrate the economic size of this effect, consider 
Kenyans with monthly income of less than 10,000 Kshs, Kenyans with monthly income between 
10,000 and 50,000 Kshs, Kenyans with income between 50,000 and 100,000 Kshs and Kenyans 
with monthly income above 100,000 Kshs. The predicted probability of being formally banked – 
controlling for the other individual characteristics – increases from 11.9% to 40.8% to 73.7% to 
82.7%, as we move across the income brackets. 
We also find that education is a strong predictor of the use of formal banking and other 
formal financial services. Kenyans with tertiary education are more likely to use formal banking 
and other formal financial services (any of the four service types) than Kenyans with secondary 
education who in turn are more likely to use these services than Kenyans with only a primary 
education who in turn are more likely to use these services than Kenyans without any formal 
education.  Older Kenyans are more likely to use financial services. Salaried employees are more 
likely to use formal financial services and are less likely to be excluded. Compared to Kenyans 
dependent on pensions or remittances, employed, self-employed and agricultural workers are 
more likely to use bank and other formal financial services and are less likely to be excluded. 
They are also more likely to use informal financial services.  While cell phone users typically 
have higher incomes, the ownership of a cell phone has an additional positive effect on the 
likelihood of using financial services, while it is negatively associated with the likelihood of 
being excluded.     
Numeracy is associated with greater use of formal bank services, but is not significantly 
associated with the use of other formal or informal financial services or with being excluded. The 
survey included several questions on basic calculus problems and on risk diversification. We find 
that people who correctly respond to these questions are more likely to use formal banking 
services, while there is no significant association with the other dependent variables. Finally, 29 
 
more risk-averse people are more likely to use informal financial services and are less likely to 
be excluded.
19   
Table 14.  Who Use Financial Services in Kenya? 
 Formal  Formal,  other  Informal  Excluded 
Own mobile phone  0.166  0.422  0.084  -0.270 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Female -0.018  -0.025  0.191  -0.097 
 (0.115)  (0.132)  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Log(age)  0.180 0.144  0.088 -0.159 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Employed  0.140 0.160  0.118 -0.144 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Self  employed  0.126 0.100  0.210 -0.164 
  (0.000)*** (0.001)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Agriculture  0.079 0.122  0.164 -0.156 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Risk  aversion  0.015 0.027  0.057 -0.047 
 (1.26)  (0.092)*  (0.004)***  (0.009)*** 
Rural  -0.081 -0.112  -0.015 0.062 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.624)  (0.023)** 
Log of total expenditures  0.078  0.064  0.074  -0.090 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Primary  education  0.085 0.105  0.118 -0.123 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Secondary  education  0.214 0.278  0.077 -0.141 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.034)**  (0.000)*** 
Tertiary  education  0.422 0.422  0.017 -0.202 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.696)  (0.000)*** 
Numeracy 0.023  0.015  -0.006  -0.006 
 (0.000)***  (0.117)  (0.460)  (0.489) 
Observations  6326 6323  6328 6328 
Source: Beck (2009). The dependent variable is whether a respondent uses (i) bank, (ii) other formal, (iii) informal 
services or (iv) is excluded. Marginal effects are reported. Regressions are weighted and stratified.  
                                                            
19 Risk aversion is a dummy variable that takes on value one if the individual responds yes to the following question: 
You avoid taking risks with your money or resources. 30 
 
 
The Effect of Bank Branching on Access to Finance 
Over ninety percent of the Kenya’s branches are in urban and rural districts (Figure 2). Branches 
in semi-arid districts account for 4.7 percent of the national total; those in arid districts account 
for 2.8 percent. Even if the definition of branch is expanded to include all types of access points - 
agencies, pay-points, mobile units, satellite branches, and sub-branches - this picture is 
essentially unchanged (93 percent in urban and rural areas, 7 percent in arid and semi-arid areas). 
The distribution also reflects a difference in geographical emphasis between private and 
government owned or influenced banks. 




The government and government-influenced banks represent about a fifth of total 
branches in urban districts, over half in rural districts, three-quarters in semi-arid districts, and 
almost ninety percent in arid districts. This suggests that government influence has a positive 
impact in promoting access to financial services but, in the absence of an analysis to assess the 
costs of government-influenced banks’ poor lending practices, it should not be concluded that 
                                                            
20 Foreign banks in the top 10 include Barclays, Standard chartered, and Stanbic. The domestic banks in the top ten 
are Equity, KREP, Baroda, and Commercial Bank of Africa. Cooperative, KCB, and NBK are the government-
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government ownership is either the best or the cheapest way in which to maintain rural access to 
the banking system.   
In 2006, a member of the Top 10 was the main bank for 75 percent of the banked 
respondents in urban areas, 67 percent in rural and semi-arid areas, and 55 percent in arid areas. 
The PostBank provides most of the remaining access, playing an increasingly important role as 
one goes from urban to arid districts. Banks that are not in the Top 10 banks play a much more 
marginal role, and then only in urban and rural districts. Although the branching figures in 
Figure 2 indicate that non-top 10 banks account for 45 percent of urban branches and 35 percent 
of rural branches, those branches provide services to far fewer people than do the branches of the 
top 10 banks.  
The analysis of interest spreads in the previous section and the discussion in the next 
section suggest that consolidation of the private banking sector might yield benefits in terms of 
both improved stability and efficiency (lower interest spreads, wider range of service offerings). 
Given the geographic segmentation of bank branches described in this section, such private 
sector consolidation would not have a major negative impact on the depth of outreach of the 
banking sector.  
At the same time, the figures in this section also show that depth of outreach remains a 
serious problem for the Kenyan financial sector. The banks best positioned to maintain or extend 
outreach are government-owned banks that are also in most in need of efficiency improvement. 
Ownership restructuring could be a solution, but efforts to privatize these banks would need to 
balance competing objectives so that profitability and efficiency improvement did not come at 
the expense of reduced outreach. Such tensions have been successfully balanced in bank 
privatizations in both Uganda and Tanzania, which offers some hope (See Clarke, Cull, and 
Fuchs, 2009 and Cull and Spreng, 2008). A more effective – and cheaper – approach to foster 
outreach may be to provide subsidies to private sector banks to increase their rural presence 
using lower cost mechanisms (such as mobile offices and new technologies such as mobile 
payments) and reinforce this by promoting the development and regulation of non-banking 
institutions such as SACCOs and MFIs. 32 
 
6.  Consolidation as an Instrument for More Efficiency and Stability 
Kenya’s Vision 2030 seeks to facilitate the transformation of the banking sector to bring in 
fewer, stronger, and larger banks. The higher capital levels in banks are expected to create a 
vibrant and globally competitive financial sector that will create jobs and also promote high 
levels of savings to finance Kenya’s overall investment needs. What does theory and 
international experience tell us about the relationship between market structure, stability and 
efficiency? 
Theoretical models have made contrasting predictions on the relationship between bank 
concentration, competition and stability.
21 On the one hand, bank concentration may enhance 
profits and therefore lower bank fragility. High profits provide a buffer against adverse shocks 
and increase the franchise value of the bank, reducing incentives for bankers to take excessive 
risk. In addition, proponents of this ‘concentration-stability’ view argue that larger banks can 
diversify better so that banking systems characterized by a few large banks will tend to be less 
fragile than banking systems with many small banks (Allen and Gale, 2004).  Further, few large 
banks might be easier to monitor than many small banks.  On the other hand, proponents of the 
concentration-fragility view argue that market power might result in higher interest rates, which 
in turn provides incentives to borrowers to take higher risks (Boyd and de Nicoló, 2005). Second, 
advocates of the concentration-fragility view argue that (i) relative to diffuse banking systems, 
concentrated banking systems generally have fewer banks and (ii) policymakers are more 
concerned about bank failures when there are only a few banks.  Based on these assumptions, 
banks in concentrated systems will tend to receive larger subsidies through implicit “too-big” or 
“too important to fail” policies that intensify risk-taking incentives and hence increase banking 
system fragility (e.g., Mishkin, 1999). Further, having larger banks in a concentrated banking 
system could also increase the contagion risk, resulting in a positive link between concentration 
and systemic fragility. 
                                                            
21 See Carletti and Hartmann (2003) for an in-depth literature survey and Allen and Gale (2004) for an excellent 
exposition on the different theoretical mechanisms that can lead to contrasting relationships between competition 
and stability. See Beck (2008) for an overview of the recent empirical literature.  33 
 
Cross-country evidence shows that more concentrated banking systems are less likely to 
suffer systemic fragility; at the same time, competition also contributes to greater stability (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2006; Schaeck, Cihak and Wolfe, 2006).  When analyzing the 
channels through which concentration might be positively associated with banking system 
stability, Beck et al. find tentative evidence that more concentrated banking systems allow better 
possibilities for banks to diversify risk.  On the other hand, they do not find any evidence that it 
is easier for bank supervisors to monitor more concentrated banking systems or that stability 
results from market power and the consequent increase in franchise values of banks in more 
concentrated banking systems.  In summary, higher concentration levels do not necessarily imply 
less competition, but might affect bank stability through other channels.  Considering bank-level 
data, researchers have arrived at different conclusions. On the one hand, Boyd, de Nicoló and 
Jalal (2006) find banks are closer to insolvency, i.e. more likely to fail, in countries with more 
concentrated banking systems. On the other hand, Schaeck, Cihak and Wolfe (2006) and 
Schaeck and Cihak (2007) show that banks have higher capital ratios in more competitive 
environments.  
Summarizing, there is no clear indication that competition is detrimental per se for bank 
stability or that a more concentrated banking system necessarily implies less competition. 
Similarly, cross-country studies have shown little effect of market structure on net interest 
margins, but rather highlighted the importance of a contestable and open banking market without 
restrictive regulatory policies (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004).  Evidence for Uganda 
has shown that macroeconomic policies and deficiencies in the contractual framework are the 
most important factors explaining high spreads and margins (Beck and Hesse, 2009).  While 
small scale can also explain high spreads, market structure indicators are not significantly 
associated with bank efficiency.  Overall, while larger banks might result in greater overall 
efficiency, the resulting higher concentration is not necessarily associated with increased or 
reduced efficiency. The effect of market structure on access to financial services, on the other 
hand, points to a potentially negative effect of a more concentrated banking system on access to 
loans by small firms (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004) and lower geographic 
outreach (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2008).  34 
 
While the Kenyan banking sector is often seen as highly oligopolistic with remarkable 
features of market concentration and leadership, it is also characterized by small-sized fringe 
banks with very high overhead costs and weak capital bases. The capital levels of most of the 
banks are below $25m which is lower than that of the smallest banks in Nigeria.  The 
Government of Kenya, through the Finance Act, 2008, has therefore begun increasing minimum 
capital requirements for banks from Kshs 250m ($3.1m) to Kshs 1bn ($12.5) by 2012.  
Cross-country evidence and the evidence across Kenyan banks presented above point to 
potential gains from such a consolidation on both the efficiency and stability of the financial 
system. On the other hand, there might be a negative impact on access, especially on customers 
of small niche banks.  Critically, however, the impact of consolidation on efficiency, stability 
and access will depend on the implications of a more concentrated banking system for 
competition.  Beyond the effect of changes in the size distribution on stability, efficiency and 
access, one should not forget the repercussions of ownership structures for these three 
dimensions of financial development.  
7.  Conclusion 
From this overview of recent development in the Kenyan banking sector, a number of themes 
emerge. First, the government reform strategy has produced a number of benefits, especially with 
regard to soundness and stability. Reducing government borrowing and creating a stable 
macroeconomic environment did much to ease lending rates and reduce spreads during this 
period. Increasing banks’ capital requirements, introducing a limited deposit insurance scheme, 
and provisioning aggressively against non-performing loans also contributed to greater banking 
sector stability. There was also improvement in the efficiency of intermediation beyond that 
attributable to improved government finances and a stable macroeconomic environment. In 
particular, banks’ overhead costs declined through competition, though the results were more 
evident for foreign-owned banks than others. Indeed, private domestic banks saw their interest 
spreads increase from 2005 to 2007, and plans to force the consolidation of some of these 
smaller banks are being considered. Access to financial services is limited to a relatively small 
subset of the Kenyan population, though this is true in much of the developing world. The banks 
with the physical infrastructure (branches) to expand access beyond the urban areas, mostly 35 
 
banks in which the government has an ownership interest, tend also to be among the least 
efficient. Obvious tensions therefore emerge in pursuing improvement in access, efficiency, and 
stability at the same time. While much has been accomplished with regard to banking reform in 
Kenya, there remains much left to do. Beyond maintaining macroeconomic stability and 
significant improvement in the contractual and informational frameworks (including the credit 
registry), regulatory and competition policies will play an important role.  A priori, however, it is 
not clear that the push towards larger banks will allow Kenya to reap benefits in terms of 
outreach.  It will be more important to focus on the ownership structure and a competitive 
environment for all banks to achieve the goals of Vision 2030. This would imply privatization of 
the remaining government-owned banks and a level regulatory playing field for all deposit-
taking institutions.  The latter includes effective, but not overly burdensome regulation and 
supervision of MFIs and SACCOs.  It also implies maintaining an openness to new, even non-
bank, providers of financial services, which has enabled the success of M-Pesa.  36 
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